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Under the principle of sovereign equality of nations, nation states are entitled 
to equal dignity (evidenced by conventions like their voting rights in the United 
Nations), have the identical capacity to contract (evidenced by their ability to 
enter into treaties), and are not subject to a superior sovereign (evidenced by the 
lack of a global leviathan). This principle also has had an important effect in 
the field of international civil litigation, in areas such as judicial jurisdiction or 
sovereign immunity. As that principle has weakened over the twentieth century, 
risks of aggravation to comity have risen, resulting in the development of other 
doctrines to re-enforce comity values. Yet ironically, to the extent these comity re-
enforcing doctrines invite (or require) courts of one state to sit in judgment of 
another state’s court or legal system they have the potential to undermine the 
very values they seek to promote. This Article offers a fresh approach to 
harnessing the advantages of those doctrines while avoiding the pitfalls they can 
entail for comity and the sovereign equality principle. 
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“This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common 
interest impeling them to mutual intercourse, and interchange of good offices with 
each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is 
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation . . . One of 
these is admitted to be the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest 
or detention within a foreign territory.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The springboard for this session of the symposium, the Lago Agrio 
litigation, presents a perfect storm for scholars of international civil 
litigation.
2
 On the one hand, the case contains allegations of plaintiffs’ 
counsel corrupting a country’s judicial system — arguably its entire legal 
apparatus — to procure a multibillion dollar judgment to be used by 
plaintiffs  to lock up Chevron’s assets around the world.
3
 On the other 
hand, the case contains efforts by Texaco to export the lawsuit from 
United States shores, followed by Chevron’s effort to return to a United 
States court in an attempt to block enforcement of the Lago Agrio 
judgment.
4
 
Seen through this lens, the case raises important questions concerning 
the extent to which one sovereign’s courts can — and should — question 
another sovereign’s actions or, more generally, the system producing those 
actions. The Lago Agrio litigation triggered these concerns in various ways. 
First, at the earliest stage of the litigation, the case called upon a U.S. court 
                                                          
1. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). 
2. The litigation has generated numerous reported decisions and commentary. See, e.g., Chevron 
Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see also Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. 
ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in 
the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL L.J. 241 (2010); Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory 
Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 19 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2009); Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue 
Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456 (2011); 
Chris Jochnick & Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New UN Framework Meets 
Texaco in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 413 (2010); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous 
Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 413 (2006). 
3. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Chevron 
Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012). 
4. See id. 
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to evaluate the “adequacy” of the Ecuadoran legal system in the context of 
Texaco’s motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.
5
 In this 
instance, the court was being asked to predict how Ecuador’s judiciary 
would treat the Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ claims if they were brought in 
Ecuador. Second, after the Lago Agrio judgment was rendered, Chevron 
sought a declaration from a U.S. court that the judgment was 
unenforceable based on alleged corruption in Ecuador’s judicial system.
6
 
Here, the court was being asked to make a backward-looking judgment 
about how the Ecuadoran system in fact treated the plaintiffs’ claims, and 
the compatibility of that system with the court’s (specifically, the Southern 
District of New York’s) judgment enforcement standards. Lastly, Chevron 
sought (and temporarily obtained) an antisuit injunction barring 
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment.
7
 Here, it was asking the court to 
balance Ecuador’s interests in seeing one of its judgments satisfied against 
the United States’ interests in ensuring that an American-based company 
was not wrongly deprived of its property as a result of an allegedly 
fraudulently obtained judgment. 
These three examples share certain common features but also differ in 
important respects. At some level, they all entail some series of factual 
findings about the Ecuadoran legal system, and require the court to lay 
those findings against a normative-laden standard (adequacy in the case of 
forum non conveniens, integrity of the judicial system in the case of judgment 
enforcement, and the interest balance in the case of the antisuit 
injunction). Beyond these surface similarities, however, the three inquiries 
differ in potentially salient respects. As already noted, the forum non 
conveniens inquiry entails a forward-looking prediction about how the 
Ecuadoran legal system would treat a set of claims; by contrast, the 
judgment enforcement and antisuit injunction inquiries entail a backward-
looking assessment about what, in fact, happened in Ecuador. 
Furthermore, the forum non conveniens inquiry occurs at a time when the 
Ecuadoran legal system has not invested substantial resources into 
adjudication of the case; by contrast, the judgment enforcement inquiry 
occurs after those resources have been invested; the antisuit injunction 
(when sought) occurs at a time when other third-country enforcement 
forums have not dedicated any resources to the enforcement of the Lago 
Agrio judgment. 
While the Lago Agrio litigation presents perhaps an especially colorful 
example, it is hardly the first time such questions have arisen. Indeed, a 
comprehensive survey of the field of international civil litigation reveals 
                                                          
5. See Jota, 157 F.3d 153; Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. 61. 
6. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581. 
7. See id. 
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that these questions, examined at a sufficiently high level of generality, 
arise with surprising regularity.
8
 To identify just a few examples: 
 These issues can arise at the front-end of a dispute when a U.S. 
court, confronted with a forum non conveniens motion, must decide 
whether the proposed foreign forum is “adequate.”
9
 
 These issues can arise in the middle of a dispute when a U.S. 
court must decide whether to order discovery in the face of a 
foreign blocking statute.
10
 
 Finally, these issues can arise at the end of a dispute when a court 
must rule on a petition to enforce a foreign judgment in the face 
of claims that the foreign judgment is the product of a corrupt 
legal system.
11
 
These examples represent just a few of the myriad doctrines requiring a 
federal court to pass judgment on the acts (or systems) of a foreign 
sovereign. 
Despite the frequency with which these issues arise, they remain 
remarkably undertheorized. While much scholarship may have focused on 
particular doctrines or nibbled at the edges of this topic,12 there has been 
far too little effort toward the construction of unified theories, whether 
positive or normative. This symposium represents a laudable step toward 
constructing such theories, regarding both what courts do and what they 
ought to do. 
This Article seeks to help fill that void. Historically, doctrines such as 
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and strict territorialist notions 
of jurisdiction (what I term “formalist” doctrines) effectively restrained 
domestic courts from regularly sitting in judgment of the acts or systems 
of a foreign sovereign. As those doctrines broke down and were replaced 
by doctrines like the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity or “effects” 
based standards for prescriptive or judicial jurisdictions, opportunities for 
jurisdictional conflict — and clash — emerged. As these doctrines raised 
                                                          
8. See generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS (5th ed. 2011). 
9. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253–54 (1981). 
10. See, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
11. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 201 F.3d 134 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
12. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the 
Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147 (2006); Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign 
Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559 (2007); Joel H. Samuels, When is 
an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059 (2010); 
Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L. REV. 395 (2006); 
Christopher A. Whytock, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1444 (2011). 
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the risks of intersovereign conflict, others, such as forum non conveniens, 
exhaustion, and comity, sought to temper these clashes. 
While well-intended, this latter group of doctrines contained its own 
challenge to the sovereign equality principle. It invited domestic courts to 
sit in judgment of the acts or systems of a foreign sovereign. This could 
occur when, for example, a U.S. court must consider whether a foreign 
sovereign’s interests counsel against the exercise of judicial jurisdiction or 
whether a foreign sovereign’s judicial system is so corrupt as to warrant 
denying enforcement to a judgment rendered within it. 
Consequently, the need for an alternative approach arises. I defend here 
a functional approach. By functional approach, I mean one that focuses on 
the judicial capacity of domestic courts to undertake these sorts of 
inquiries about their foreign counterparts and their legal systems; such 
undertakings can entail significant risks for the sovereign equality principle. 
Unpacking in functional terms what precisely motivates concerns about 
domestic courts sitting in judgment of a foreign sovereign’s acts or 
decisions — and considering the extent to which one can mitigate those 
concerns — helps reconcile the sovereign equality principle with the 
jurisdictional competition that has marked the modern era of international 
civil litigation.  
This Article develops those themes in three parts. Part I articulates a 
definition of sovereign equality, sketches out the doctrines in which issues 
of sovereign equality arise, and categorizes those doctrines. Part II 
develops a functional theory in which to examine these issues. Part III 
examines the implications of the functional theory for the doctrinal 
puzzles. 
I. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND DOCTRINE 
The concept at issue in this panel of the symposium, “the sovereign 
equality of nations,” has received extensive treatment in the academic 
literature.
13
 Famously embraced in the UN Charter,
14
 the principle 
emerged from the post-Westphalian consensus that gave primacy to 
                                                          
13. See, e.g., Charles W. Powers, Ethics and United States Trade Policy, in 5 COMM’N ON CRITICAL 
CHOICES FOR AMS., CRITICAL CHOICES FOR AMERICANS: TRADE, INFLATION & ETHICS 253, 261 
(1976); Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 
751 (1993); John H. Jackson, The Changing Fundamentals of International Law and Ten Years of the WTO, 8 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2005); Brad R. Roth, Coming to Terms with Ruthlessness: Sovereign Equality, Global 
Pluralism, and the Limits of International Criminal Justice, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 231 (2010); Carlos 
M. Vásquez, Withdrawing from International Custom: Terrible Food, Small Portions, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
269 (2011). For a good, if slightly dated, collection of literature, see John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-
Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 784 nn.8–9 (2003). 
14. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. 
186 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 53:181 
nation-states and, in the words of the International Court of Justice, serves 
as “one of the fundamental principles of the national legal order.”
15
 
As John Jackson has explained, the sovereign equality principle “has 
many dimensions.”
16
 One dimension of this principle focuses on 
sovereignty. The concept entails the complete and unfettered exercise of 
jurisdiction of a sovereign within its boundaries. A corollary is one of 
noninterference: one sovereign cannot assert jurisdiction (whether 
legislative or judicial) within another sovereign’s territory. Finally, the 
concept lays the intellectual foundation for the principle of immunity — 
that one sovereign (or its diplomatic representatives or property) remains 
immune from suit in another sovereign’s courts. In the words of Chief 
Justice Marshall from Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
17
 one sovereign was 
implicitly waiving a small part of its absolute authority over conduct within 
its territory.
18
 
The other dimension centers on “equality.” Sovereigns became the 
relevant agents at the level of international law; for instance, they can 
consent to matters (in the case of treaties). Their conduct supplies the 
basis for the identification of custom in international law. No entity enjoys 
an authority superior to sovereign nation-states. 
For several centuries following the principle’s emergence, formalist 
doctrines adequately sustained it. Strict territorialist doctrines governed the 
exercise of both judicial jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction by 
states.
19
 Conflict of law rules precluded private parties from avoiding 
judicial or prescriptive jurisdiction by means of choice-of-law or forum 
selection clauses.
20
 Absolute theories of sovereign immunity precluded 
nations from exercising jurisdiction over other nations.
21
 Even when the 
nations themselves were not parties to a suit, one sovereign’s courts 
refused to sit in judgment of the validity of acts taken in another 
sovereign’s territory.
22
 
In the late nineteenth and especially the twentieth century, these 
formalist doctrines described in the preceding paragraph began to erode, 
weakening the sovereign equality principle. Territorialist notions of judicial 
                                                          
15. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, ¶ 57 (Feb. 
3, 2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/85wafeo. 
16. Jackson, supra note 13, at 782. 
17. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
18. Id. at 136. 
19. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S 
714 (1877). 
20. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (discussing the historical judicial 
hostility to forum selection agreements); 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 1080 (1935) (discussing unenforceability of choice-of-law clauses). 
21. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 
137. 
22. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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and prescriptive jurisdiction were replaced with rules permitting the 
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction over conduct that had an “effect” 
on the regulating sovereign.
23
 Choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses 
were increasingly enforced.
24
 A restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 
encapsulated most famously in the Tate Letter,25 replaced more absolutist 
notions.
26
 Limits emerged to the act-of-state doctrine, and the foreign-
sovereign-compulsion doctrine faded into obscurity.
27
 The net effect of 
these changes would be to increase jurisdictional competition among 
sovereigns over the regulation of the same conduct and, consequently, the 
opportunities for clashes between countries. Despite the re-emergence of 
some territorialist doctrines in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries,
28
 the net effect has been a weakening of the formalist notions 
that once buttressed the sovereign equality principle. 
While these doctrinal developments weakened the principle of 
sovereign equality, other doctrines helped to strengthen it. For example, in 
the judicial jurisdiction context, the “reasonableness” prong contemplated 
consideration of the foreign sovereign’s interests.
29
 “Comity” doctrines 
constrained the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, especially in antitrust 
cases.
30
 Forum non conveniens and exhaustion doctrines reduce jurisdictional 
conflict by channeling some cases to foreign courts even where jurisdiction 
of the U.S. court is authorized.
31
 Finally, while sovereign immunity may be 
riddled with exceptions, the law still presumes the sovereign’s immunity 
from suit.
32
 
While seeking to reduce the risks of jurisdictional competition, each of 
these limits also had the effect of forcing courts to wade more deeply into 
the acts or systems of a foreign sovereign and, thus, risk offending the 
                                                          
23. See  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & 
Co., 671 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
24. See Bremen, 407 U.S. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971). 
25. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
Acting U.S. Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dept. State Bull. 984–985 (1952). 
26. See id. 
27. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S 400 (1990). See generally 
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at ch. 9. 
28. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion); Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
29. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
30. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)), as recognized in McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
31. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253–54 (1981); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). 
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sovereign equality principle. For example, the “reasonableness” prong of 
the personal jurisdiction inquiry forced courts to weigh the interests of a 
foreign sovereign state and, thereby, entailed the risk that some sovereign’s 
interests would be insufficiently weighty.
33
 The forum non conveniens doctrine 
required U.S. courts to decide whether a foreign judicial system was 
“adequate” (setting up the possibility that one sovereign’s courts might be 
more adequate than another’s). The exhaustion doctrine, designed in an 
effort to channel some disputes to a foreign court, forced U.S. courts also 
to consider whether resort to some foreign forums might be futile.
34
 
Foreign judgment enforcement doctrines, though founded on principles of 
comity, forced courts to consider whether the judgment was the product 
of a corrupt system.
35
 Ironically then, in an effort to shore up the 
sovereign equality principle, these various doctrinal developments 
threatened to undermine it. 
Efforts to moderate erosion of the sovereign equality principle have not 
developed in a systematic or coherent manner. Instead, they largely have 
emerged through judicial adaptations on the margins of the doctrine.
36
 
This incremental form of development ensures that courts must consider, 
constantly anew, how to preserve the core of the equality principle in a 
world of constantly conflicting assertions of jurisdiction. Consequently, it 
becomes critical to think systematically about these doctrinal categories 
and theorize how to reconcile them with the sovereign equality principle.  
 All doctrines implicating the sovereign equality of nations can, with the 
exception of some debatable grey areas, be divided into three main 
categories: (1) sovereign as party; (2) sovereign as adjudicator; and (3) 
sovereign as regulator. Categorization along these lines permits more 
theoretically rich consideration of the effects of these doctrines upon the 
sovereign equality principle. 
I will begin with the easiest case — the sovereign as party. This was the 
type of situation envisioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Schooner Exchange.
37
 Such issues obviously come up in cases against foreign 
sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
38
 They 
                                                          
33. See, e.g., Afram Exp. Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir.1985). 
34. See, e.g., Abiola v. Abubakar, 435 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
35. See, e.g., Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 201 F.3d 134 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
36. To be sure, there are exceptions where Congress has spoken directly, such as the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)),the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, Pub. 
L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1964) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) 
(2006)), and the Helms-Burton Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified as amended 
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643l, 1643m, 6021–6024, 6031–6046, 6061–6067, 6081–6085, 6091 (2006 & Supp. V 
2011)). I return to these examples infra Part III. 
37.  Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). 
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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also appear in cases where an individual is being sued in his or her capacity 
as a representative of a foreign sovereign, such as cases involving claims of 
diplomatic immunity, head-of-state immunity, and official immunity.
39
 
Each of these cases potentially implicates the sovereign equality principle. 
To the extent immunity does not warrant dismissal of the suit, one 
sovereign’s courts are sitting in judgment of the conduct of another 
sovereign (or that sovereign’s agent). Maintenance of the suit imposes 
costs on the sovereign — whether in the form of litigation costs or in the 
form of a judgment that might be enforced in jurisdictions where the 
sovereign has assets. Maintenance of the suit also can ruffle the foreign 
relations of the United States, evidenced for example by the diplomatic 
protests that have been filed by sovereign governments sued as 
defendants.
40
 
The second set of doctrines involves the state as adjudicator. The Lago 
Agrio litigation raises several such doctrines — forum non conveniens, 
judgment enforcement, and antisuit injunctions. Other doctrines falling 
into this category include the enforcement of arbitral awards (particularly 
the question whether to enforce awards set aside in the arbitral forum),
41
 
exhaustion,
42
 and the decision whether to issue a stay lis alibi pendens.
43
 Like 
the cases involving the state as a party, they too can undermine the foreign 
relations of the United States or the activities of the political branches. 
Unlike cases involving the state as a party, they do not necessarily entail 
the same litigation or judgment compliance costs. Nonetheless, these suits 
may entail some costs, depending on the degree to which the foreign 
judicial system already has invested in the suit. For example, cases 
involving doctrines such as forum non conveniens dismissals, exhaustion 
requirements (coupled with futility exceptions), and possibly personal 
jurisdiction dismissals, may involve relatively low costs because the foreign 
sovereign judicial system generally has not invested in the suit. By contrast, 
costs may be much higher in cases involving doctrines like judgment 
enforcement due to the investment of resources by the foreign 
sovereign.
44
 
Finally, some doctrines involve cases of the state as regulator. Unlike 
the preceding set of doctrines, these cases do not necessarily involve a U.S. 
court passing judgment on the act of a foreign judiciary (or a foreign 
judicial system’s capacity to undertake that act). Nonetheless, they entail 
                                                          
39. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra 
note 7, at ch. 3. 
40. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at ch. 3. 
41. See  In re Chromalloy Aeroservices, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). 
42. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
43. See, e.g., Continental Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
44. Doctrines involving parallel proceedings, like antisuit injunctions and stays lis alibi pendens, fall 
between these two poles. 
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review of other acts, often legislative ones. For example, the act-of-state 
doctrine precludes U.S. courts from sitting in judgment of the validity of 
foreign acts of state taking place on the foreign sovereign’s territory.
45
 
Similarly, the foreign-sovereign-compulsion doctrine precludes a U.S. 
court from requiring conduct that would be illegal in another state.
46
 
Other doctrines do not have quite the same categorical bite, but 
nonetheless require consideration of a foreign sovereign’s legislative acts. 
Resolving discovery conflicts in the face of blocking statutes and public 
policy exceptions to the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses all require 
courts to balance the competing interests of the court’s own sovereign and 
those of the foreign sovereign lawmaking body.
47
 Finally, territoriality rules 
governing prescriptive jurisdiction can indirectly affect a foreign state as 
regulator to the extent the U.S. rule regulates overseas conduct in a 
manner different than the state in whose territory the conduct is 
occurring.
48
 
The following table summarizes the basic framework set forth in this 
Part: 
TABLE 1 
 
Function of State Example of Doctrines Implicating 
the Sovereign Equality Principle 
 
State as Party Sovereign immunity and exceptions 
 
State as Regulator Extraterritoriality; Act of State 
Doctrine; Foreign Sovereign 
Compulsion Doctrine; Choice-of-
Law Rules; Discovery Disputes 
 
State as Adjudicator Judicial Jurisdiction; Forum Non 
Conveniens; Lis Alibi Pendens; Antisuit 
Injunctions; Judgment Enforcement 
Rules 
 
 
                                                          
45. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
46. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 279 F.R.D. 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Animal Sci. Prod., 
Inc. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010), vacated, 
654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Tex. Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. 
Del. 1970). 
47. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 7, at chs. 5, 11. 
48. See id. at ch. 8. 
2012] A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN EQUALITY  191 
This Part has illustrated the myriad situations in which doctrines 
involving the sovereign equality of nations may arise. It also has articulated 
a potential framework in which to categorize those doctrines. The next 
Part offers a functional approach to evaluating how courts treat the 
sovereign equality principle in these various doctrinal categories. 
II. TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
The preceding Part offered a working definition of the sovereign 
equality of nations, identified the various doctrines potentially implicating 
that principle, and suggested a potentially useful classification of those 
doctrines. This Part articulates an approach for thinking about the 
principle of sovereign equality in functional terms. 
To be clear, by functional approach, I mean one that rejects “formalist” 
notions of what courts can (or should) and cannot (or should not) do. 
Instead, a functional approach examines the fitness of courts to play the 
particular roles that they are sometimes asked to undertake in international 
disputes. 
Of course, at a sufficiently broad level, one can argue that the 
overarching concern here is one of judicial intervention in the foreign 
affairs of the United States. Anytime a court ventures into a case involving 
a foreign sovereign or conduct abroad, those risks arise. For the analysis to 
be more meaningful, it becomes necessary to unpack this generalized 
foreign affairs concern and examine the precise ways in which judicial 
doctrines might tread upon the sovereign equality principle. Here, I 
identify three specific concerns: (1) institutional; (2) constitutional; and (3) 
retaliation. In the following Subsections, I explore the constraint and the 
extent to which mechanisms exist to mitigate the risks. 
A. Institutional Constraints 
One set of concerns relates to the capacity of federal judges to conduct 
the inquiry required by these doctrines. Jurists have not come to an 
agreement concerning their own capacities in this regard.
49
 
                                                          
49. One classic formulation comes from Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in the Reinsurance case: 
 
If I thought we had to do such balancing, I would be at sea. If I knew how to balance 
incommensurables, I would be hard pressed to agree with courts saying (as the district judge 
did) that a suit by the government is “more important” than private litigation. In a capitalist 
economy enforcement of contracts is a subject of the first magnitude. The gravity of the 
nation’s interest is no less when it decides to enforce vital rules through private initiative. A 
court would need to know the “importance” of the substantive rule, which is not well 
correlated with the enforcement mechanism. (The antitrust laws are “more important” than 
the littering laws, although the former are largely enforced by private suits and the latter by 
public prosecutions.) 
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Some institutional constraints concern the court’s ability to make value-
laden judgments about seemingly incommensurable values. For example, 
some discovery disputes or the Gilbert factors of the forum non conveniens 
determinations expressly require judges to engage in a normative inquiry 
balancing the competing interests of sovereigns with a stake in the case.
50 
Here, the capacity concern stems from a belief that judges lack the 
necessary skill and training to ascertain the “strength” of a particular 
sovereign’s interest. 
Other institutional constraints instead focus upon the court’s lack of 
access to the relevant information necessary to make an accurate decision, 
and therefore raises concerns about error costs. Doctrines such as the 
“adequacy” determination in the forum non conveniens doctrine or the “bias” 
exception to the enforcement of foreign judgments involve different 
capacity concerns. Can a U.S. court ever accurately assess the 
Ecuadoran — or any foreign — legal system? Differences in the primary 
language of the two countries, or limited access to the relevant legal 
sources may make these concerns particularly acute. Here, the concern 
goes primarily to error rates rather than some institutional constraint on 
the court to make a normative determination. 
While these institutional concerns are significant, various mechanisms 
might dampen their effects. For example, as to the former capacity 
constraint (involving interest balancing), a court can solicit the views of the 
U.S. Government and, where appropriate, the foreign government. The 
U.S. Government routinely files such statements in matters of 
international civil litigation.
51
 By contrast, statements by foreign 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1284 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
A slightly different perspective comes from Judge Kozinski’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit in 
Patrickson: 
 
Nor do we understand how a court can go about evaluating the foreign policy implications of 
another government's expression of interest. Assuming that foreign relations are an 
appropriate consideration at all, the relevant question is not whether the foreign government 
is pleased or displeased by the litigation, but how the case affects the interests of the United 
States. That is an inherently political judgment, one that courts – whether state or federal – 
are not competent to make. If courts were to take the interests of the foreign government 
into account, they would be conducting foreign policy by deciding whether it serves our 
national interests to continue with the litigation, dismiss it on some ground such as forum 
non conveniens, or deal with it in some other way.  Because such political judgments are not 
within the competence of either state or federal courts, we can see no support for the 
proposition that federal courts are better equipped than state courts to deal with cases raising 
such concerns. 
 
Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803–04 (9th Cir., 2001) (citations omitted). 
50. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
51. See, e.g, Statement of Interest of the U.S., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 
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governments are less routine, but there certainly are examples of foreign 
governments addressing how a particular legal question affects their 
interest; the Lago Agrio litigation is a prime example.
52
 As to the latter 
capacity constraint (involving access to relevant information and error 
rates), a court can (and often does) rely on experts — whether offered by 
the parties or designated by the court itself — to educate the court about 
the contours of a legal system. Those expert opinions hold forth the 
potential of reducing error rates in the court’s assessment of a foreign legal 
system. 
Of course, these mechanisms do not completely overcome the 
institutional constraints. As to the former, assessing the interests of the 
United States may not always be easy, particularly given the ongoing 
debates about the shared responsibility of the Executive Branch and 
Congress for the maintenance of foreign affairs. Moreover, changes in 
Administration may lead to changes in litigating positions, as recent 
experience under the Alien Tort Statute
53
 or the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act exemplifies.
54
 On the foreign government front, disputes 
may arise over who “speaks” for the foreign government, as exemplified 
by the South Africa litigation.
55
 As to the latter institutional constraint 
regarding error costs, reliance on experts merely transfers the error risks to 
the expert opinion, and sometimes courts must resolve disputes between 
the parties’ experts over matters of methodology and form. 
Ultimately, my goal here is not to resolve as a categorical matter 
whether institutional constraints are severe or capable of mitigation. 
Rather, my aim here is to unpack precisely what we mean when we express 
doubts about the capacity of courts in conducting the inquiries and, more 
importantly, to identify possible modes by which those capacity concerns 
can be addressed. In Part III we can examine at a more granular level the 
extent to which particular doctrines lend themselves to these types of 
devices, which may shape our view about when a particular doctrine 
threatens the sovereign equality principle. 
                                                                                                                                      
94-9035, 94-9069); Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 
1989) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039); Memorandum for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090); Supplemental Statement of Interest of the U.S., Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. CIV.A.01-1357(LFO)). 
52. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 
61 (S.D. Tex. 1994). 
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
54. See Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and Executive Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (2011). 
55. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 276–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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B. Constitutional Constraints 
Even assuming courts have the capacity to weigh the effect of an action 
on the sovereign equality principle, separate constitutional concerns may 
arise on the ground that the very undertaking is inconsistent with 
separation-of-powers principles. Under this critique, when courts utilize 
and develop doctrines that tread upon the acts of a foreign sovereign, they 
intrude upon the prerogatives of the political branches. These branches, so 
the argument goes, retain control over the foreign affairs power of the 
United States. Thus, absent express authorization from the political 
branches, courts should stay their hand. Judicially crafted doctrines such as 
antisuit injunctions would be inconsistent with this conception of the 
foreign affairs power, as would aggressive assertions of prescriptive or 
judicial jurisdiction absent express legislative authorization. A particularly 
hot-button example in international civil litigation right now is the federal 
courts’ exercise of their residual federal common law lawmaking power 
under the Alien Tort Statute to impose civil liability for certain violations 
of the law of nations.
56
 
Here too, mechanisms might exist to soften the blow to separation-of-
powers principles. Most obviously, courts might solicit — and defer to —
the views of the Executive Branch in weighing the effect of an assertion of 
jurisdiction or exercise of federal common law lawmaking power. Courts 
have articulated various doctrines directly tied to the Executive Branch’s 
views, such as the policy of case-specific deference to the Executive 
Branch on the foreign relations implications of entertaining jurisdiction in 
a particular suit,
57
 the Bernstein exception to the act-of-state doctrine,
58
 and 
judicial acceptance of the Executive Branch’s view on questions of foreign 
official immunity.
59
 
As with the mechanisms examined in the preceding Subpart, these 
mechanisms are helpful, but hardly foolproof. One should not overlook 
the cost to the Executive Branch of having to offer its view on a case. 
Sometimes, the political calculus is weighty on both sides, and turning the 
case on the views of the Executive Branch may force the government to 
take a position when it prefers not to do so.
60
 
                                                          
56. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
57. See id., at 733 n.21; Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 & nn.21–22 (2004). 
58. See, e.g., Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 
375 (2d Cir. 1954). 
59. See ; Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity and Federal Common Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 589 (2011); Rutledge, supra note 54. 
60. Such concerns animated the State Department’s desire to surrender control over foreign 
sovereign immunity determinations and, instead, have the matter managed under the FSIA’s 
framework. 
2012] A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN EQUALITY  195 
C. Retaliation 
Finally, related to the two foregoing concerns, but warranting distinct 
treatment, judicial activity in the field of international civil litigation may 
trigger concerns about retaliation. For example, countries have enacted 
retaliatory jurisdiction laws permitting the exercise of judicial jurisdiction 
over a foreign company to the extent the courts of the country where that 
company is located would exercise jurisdiction.
61
 Other countries have 
enacted blocking statutes in response to assertions of discovery power by 
U.S. courts.
62
 Along the same lines, foreign countries have enacted 
clawback statutes in response to extraterritorial assertions of prescriptive 
jurisdiction.
63
 These examples certainly illustrate that actual retaliation is 
possible. The actual incidence of retaliation remains rare, suggesting that 
the doctrine is being driven more by fears that retaliation could occur if 
courts do not stay their hand in certain cases. 
Various doctrines mitigate the risk, including the presumption against 
extraterritoriality
64
 and the presumption not to construe statutes so as to 
interfere with the legitimate interest of foreign sovereign states.
65
 Courts 
also have adopted rules taking the prospect of foreign sovereign retaliation 
into account, such as when they craft a sanction for noncompliance with a 
discovery order due to a foreign blocking statute.
66
 
Here too, the mitigating factors are helpful but hardly complete. Canons 
such as those against extraterritoriality or against interference with foreign 
sovereign interests are easier to articulate than to apply. They beg the 
question how a court is to decide whether Congress has overcome the 
presumption or whether the interference with a foreign sovereign interest 
is sufficiently weighty. The devil here, as usual, is in the details. 
This Part has articulated a functional framework for evaluating how 
legal doctrines manage the sovereign equality principle. The focus has been 
on various concerns that could arise when federal courts apply a particular 
doctrine, specifically issues of capacity, retaliation, and separation of 
powers. To varying degrees, escape hatches are available to courts to 
temper those effects on the sovereign equality principle. The final Part 
applies this approach to the three categories of cases — sovereign as party, 
                                                          
61. See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 1, 15 (1987). 
62. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at 972. 
63. See id., at 682. 
64. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Love v. Associated 
Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2010); Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 
F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010). 
65. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 442 (1987). 
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sovereign as adjudicator, and sovereign as legislator — that might 
implicate the principle. 
III. THE FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
This Part combines the typology developed in Part I with the functional 
considerations developed in Part II. My central thesis is that the functional 
concerns raised in Part II are at their nadir in cases involving the state as a 
party, are of moderate significance in cases involving the state as regulator, 
and are at their zenith in cases involving state as adjudicator. The upshot 
of the thesis is two-fold: (1) that courts should be most sensitive to the 
sovereign equality principle in cases involving foreign states as adjudicators 
and (2) policymakers should examine additional means by which U.S. 
courts can mitigate those risks to the sovereign equality principle in these 
cases. 
A. State as Party 
With respect to cases where the foreign state is a party, courts suffer 
from relatively few capacity constraints. Enactment of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act has overcome both forms of capacity 
constraints. As to first-order capacity constraints, the FSIA has rendered 
the immunity determination a largely statutory inquiry, something that 
courts are fully equipped to undertake. As to second-order capacity 
constraints, both the definitions of the entities in § 1603
67
 and the 
definition of the exceptions in § 1605,
68
 do not entail the sort of value-
laden determinations that troubled some judges.
69
 Thus, insofar as we are 
concerned about judicial capacity, and whether we are dealing with first-
order or second-order concerns, cases involving foreign states as parties 
present relatively little threat to the sovereign equality principle. 
Likewise, cases involving states as parties generally do not entail 
significant concerns about separation of powers. The grant of jurisdiction 
set forth in the FSIA indicates congressional comfort with the immunity 
determination. For similar reasons, to the extent the assertion of 
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign risks retaliation by the sovereign, 
Congress presumably considered this risk in weighing whether to authorize 
the particular grant of jurisdiction. Even where such a risk was unforeseen 
or is especially weighty, the Court has left open an escape hatch through 
                                                          
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006). 
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
69. See supra note 49. Put another way, judges applying the FSIA merely are making 
determinations about a party’s institutional affiliations and conduct rather than weighing competing 
interests of sovereign states. 
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case-by-case deference to the views of the Executive Branch on the 
diplomatic implications of entertaining a particular suit.
70
 
Yet the FSIA also demonstrates that there are various degrees to which 
the political branches might retain a residual role. § 1605A
71
 supplies an 
important counterpoint. Among other things, this section stipulates that a 
state can be sued under the terrorism and torture exception only if the 
Secretary of State has determined that the state is a “state sponsor of 
terrorism.”
72 Conceptually, the FSIA might extend this same model to all 
the immunity determinations, assuring the Executive Branch a greater role 
in controlling the extent to which a sister sovereign state is sued. 
B. State as Legislator 
With respect to capacity constraints, error costs can be mitigated 
through effective use of party-appointed or court-appointed experts to 
educate the court about the foreign sovereign’s law or legal system. For 
example, in the foreign sovereign compulsion context, such experts can 
educate the U.S. court on whether a foreign legal system prohibits a 
particular course of conduct. Likewise, in the discovery context, experts 
can educate a court on the penalties that might attach if a foreign party 
complies with a U.S. court’s discovery order. 
Where courts must evaluate the legislative acts of a foreign sovereign, 
here too they have tools to reduce the impact on foreign affairs and to 
mitigate the risk of retaliation. The presumption against extraterritoriality 
supplies a good example. Under that presumption, federal courts will 
presume that Congress has not intended to give a law extraterritorial effect 
unless it has spoken clearly. The presumption reduces the risk that courts 
will mistakenly entertain cases predicated on extraterritorial conduct, 
particularly in situations (such as antitrust) where the foreign sovereign 
may tolerate or even approve of the conduct.
73
 Since the presumption only 
operates at the level of statutory interpretation however, the doctrine 
preserves for the political branches the ability to regulate extraterritorial 
conduct where they see fit (and under particular terms). 
Seen against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
74
 can be understood as an effort to 
re-enforce the separation-of-powers concerns underpinning the sovereign 
                                                          
70. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701–02 (2004). 
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. V 2011). 
72. See id. 
73. In this regard, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 
96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)) offers an exceptional attempt by the political 
branches to hem in the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct having an 
effect in the United States. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004). 
74. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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equality principle. The Court held that the federal securities laws lacked the 
plain statement of congressional intent to apply to allegedly fraudulent 
transactions involving foreign plaintiffs taking place on foreign 
exchanges.
75
 In the wake of the Court’s decision, however, Congress 
amended the securities laws to restore extraterritorial application but only 
as to suits brought by the Justice Department or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.
76
 This partial overruling of Morrison can be 
understood as a vindication of the Court’s decision, because Congress was 
forced to determine the extent to which it wished — and did not wish — 
to allow private plaintiffs (as opposed to government officials) to use U.S. 
securities laws to regulate conduct taking place on foreign soil. 
Similar efforts to address separation-of-powers concerns in sovereign 
qua regulator cases can be found in the act-of-state doctrine. That federal 
common law doctrine, as noted above, precludes courts from sitting in 
judgment of the validity of the acts of a foreign sovereign taken on its own 
soil.
77
 An underlying purpose for the doctrine is to reduce friction in the 
foreign relations of the United States. Based on this animating principle, 
some courts (though never a clear majority of the Supreme Court) have 
recognized an exception to the doctrine where the Executive Branch 
indicates that it has no objections to maintenance of the suit.
78
 The 
Bernstein exception (so named for a pair of post-World War II cases that 
presented the issue) serves a purpose quite similar to the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. To buttress the sovereign equality principle, the 
Court articulated a doctrine rooted in separation-of-powers concerns but 
left space for the political branches to eliminate those concerns through a 
clear statement of its position.
79
 
C. State as Adjudicator 
With respect to first-order capacity constraints, the analysis of cases 
involving the state as adjudicator does not differ materially from those 
involving the state as regulator. 
More difficult, however, is figuring out how to overcome the second-
order capacity constraints on judges’ abilities to balance incommensurables 
such as competing countries’ interests in hearing a case. With respect to 
                                                          
75. See id., at 2877–83. 
76. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–1865 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa, 80b-14).  
77. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
78. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
79. Sometimes the political branches express their tolerance for such suits in an express 
statement in the litigation (the classic Bernstein exception scenario). In other cases, the political 
branches may express their views through legislative action taken prior to an actual dispute (as in the 
Second Hickenlooper Amendment or the Helms-Burton Act). 
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the United States at least, statements of interest provide a vehicle by which 
to gauge the domestic interest. With respect to foreign interests, countries 
might express their interests through diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, or 
even the enactment of legislation. 
While these devices help, they are hardly fail-safes. For one thing, they 
present an information-forcing problem — should a sovereign (whether 
the United States or foreign) be required to articulate its interest in a case? 
Experience with sovereign immunity law prior to the FSIA’s enactment 
suggests that governments are not always keen of being put in that 
position.
80
 For another thing, governments change, and consequently so 
do their interests. The United States’ litigating position under the Alien 
Tort Statute has changed dramatically between the Bush and Obama 
Administrations: similarly, Ecuador’s views on the Lago Agrio litigation 
changed remarkably over the course of the case.
81
 Changing 
governments — and consequent shifts in their litigating positions — 
complicate the interest balancing inquiry, especially when cases are 
protracted as international cases often are. Finally, even if the two 
foregoing problems can be overcome, courts still face the task of 
balancing, particularly where the sovereigns’ interests collide (as they often 
do, for example, in the discovery context). 
Risks of retaliation are especially difficult to monitor. Sovereigns might 
retaliate by imposing anti-antisuit injunctions or refusing to enforce U.S. 
judgments. Such retaliation may only materialize after the U.S. court has 
awarded relief (or refused to do so), requiring the court to engage in a 
degree of prediction about how the foreign sovereign’s courts might act. 
Often, sovereigns do not make their views known, and instead the court is 
faced with a private party’s representation that a particular judicial act will 
result in some retaliation by the foreign sovereign. Foreign sovereigns have 
on occasion made their views known, whether through judicial filings or 
communications with the State Department, but such airing of the 
sovereign’s view tends not to occur in response to any formal mechanism. 
Congress might fill an important gap here by amending the United States 
Code explicitly to authorize courts to invite statements of interest from 
foreign governments, just as they do from the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lago Agrio litigation supplies a good example of a case highlighting 
the collision between modern international civil litigation doctrines and the 
sovereign equality principle. As new doctrines have emerged to mitigate 
                                                          
80. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 8, at 233–34. 
81. See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 389 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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the risks of conflict and jurisdictional competition, those doctrines have 
forced courts to make an increasing array of normative determinations 
about the weight of a foreign sovereign’s interests, the legitimacy of its 
conduct, or the adequacy of its system. Though perhaps designed to shore 
up the sovereign equality principle, these doctrines can end up harming it. 
A functional approach reduces the risk of such harm. Such an approach 
trains on the capacity (and limits) of a court to undertake the inquiries 
demanded by these doctrines. Those capacities and limits differ radically 
depending on whether the court is evaluating the foreign state as a party, 
an adjudicator, or a regulator. Of special concern are cases where courts 
are asked to make prospective assessments about the risk of retaliation by 
a foreign sovereign and cases where courts are asked to weigh the strength 
of a foreign sovereign’s interest. More formal mechanisms for soliciting 
the views of foreign governments, akin to requests for statements of 
interest by the United States, can lower, though not eliminate, those risks. 
